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PRIVACY OR PROTECTION: THE JUVENILE
DILEMMA
I.

INTRODUCTION

For little over a decade, the United States Supreme Court
has been active in delineating the constitutional status of children vis-A-vis their parents and the state.' While the Court
has consistently upheld the constitutional rights of children, it
has been reluctant to establish clear guidelines as to the nature and extent of a child's interests, particularly when these
interests are in conflict with those of his parents.
The Court's most affirmative statement in this area has
come in its recent recognition that minors possess a right to
privacy. Thus far, this "privacy" right has been asserted only
in the cases involving minors' decisions regarding abortions2
and the use of contraceptives., This comment analyzes current case law and distills elements that may be used in determining the existence and extent of a minor's "right of privacy" in factual contexts other than those involving
contraceptives and abortion. Part II reviews the traditional
treatment of children in our society and Part III examines the
United States Supreme Court's selective incorporation of constitutional rights with respect to children. The comment next
considers the Court's recent recognition of children's privacy
rights as a basis for the further extension of constitutional
protections to minors. In this regard, Part IV examines the
general development of the constitutional right to privacy
with particular emphasis on the nature of children's privacy
0 1981 by Page Humphrey
1. See, e.g., Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584
(1979); Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U.S. 678 (1977); Planned
Parenthood of Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976); Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519
(1975); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972);
McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970);
Tinker v. Des Moines School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969); Ginsberg v. New York, 390
U.S. 629 (1968); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541
(1966).
2. See Planned Parenthood of Missouri v. Danforth, 423 U.S. 52 (1976); Bellotti
v. Baird, 443 U.S. 662 (1979).
3. See Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
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rights.

Part V examines the limitations that state and parental
authority place on the scope of children's constitutional rights
and questions whether status as a minor is a proper justification for minimizing a child's constitutional safeguards. Various decisions discussed below have qualified the constitutional
protections given to minors to such an extent that, in order to
understand the scope of a child's right to privacy, it is necessary to examine the context -

school, family, hospital -

in

which minor's rights are asserted, as well as the reasons given
to support the curtailment of these rights. The comment concludes by considering the Court's probable future treatment
of minors' constitutional rights and discusses the factors that
the Court focuses on in determining the scope of children's
rights.
II.

TRADITIONAL TREATMENT OF CHILDREN

The twentieth century attitude toward children in our society has been rooted in a legal paternalism based on the
state's interest in protecting health and preserving life. Under
4 or parent substitute, the state
the doctrine of parens patriae,
is seen as having a duty to protect and provide for the welfare
of children whose parents have failed to do so. In addition,
our society recognizes that "the power of the state to control
the conduct of children reaches beyond the scope of its authority over adults.""
John Stuart Mill felt that it was necessary to limit the
freedom of children so as to protect them from "their own actions as well as against external injury." Our society has traditionally endorsed that principle and recognizes "that the
4.

The doctrine of parens patriae, which literally means "father of his coun-

try," has a long history.

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY

1003 (5th ed. 1979).

"In Ex Parte Crouse, 4 Wharton 9, 11 (Pa. 1839), the parens patriae doctrine
suddenly emerged, setting forth a supposed inherent right of the state as superior
parent for those children whose parents were deemed unfit, a right on the part of the
state to separate them for the supposed welfare of the child and the state." NAT'L
JUVENILE LAW CENTER, LAW AND TACTICS IN JUVENILE CASES 2 (2d ed. 1974).
In more recent times, "the Latin phrase [has proven] to be a great help to those

who [seek] to rationalize the exclusion of juveniles from the constitutional scheme;
but its
Gault,
5.
6.

meaning is murky and its historic credentials are of dubious relevance." In re
387 U.S. 1, 16 (1967).
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944).
J.S. MILL, ON LIBERTY 11 (D. Spitz ed. 1975).
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status of youth differs from the status of adulthood."' Consequently, although children are afforded certain protections,
numerous rights and privileges enjoyed by adults are denied
to them.8
In recognizing the fundamental differences between children and adults, the juvenile courts were established by the
state to deal solely with the unique problems and needs of
children. The rationale of the juvenile court system is to rehabilitate delinquent children and to protect them from the impersonal treatment and harsh consequences of the adult criminal justice system.9 However, the state in this parens patriae
role somewhat inconsistently limits the application of adult
court procedures and constitutional protections to juveniles
within the juvenile court system, allegedly in order to serve
the "state's interest in promoting the health and growth of
children." 10
It is necessary to review the nature of the juvenile court
system because the state has asserted interests in the system
that the courts have considered in deciding whether to extend
a particular constitutional right to children. The state has two
basic interests in limiting children's procedural protections
within the juvenile court system.1 1 First, it is argued that the
non-adversary and civil character of juvenile court makes such
protection unnecessary. 12 The state acts in the child's best interests within the juvenile court system, which is ostensibly
modeled after the family structure rather than the criminal
justice system. The state's theory seems to be that, since there
is no fear that the minor will be "convicted" or "labeled" in
the juvenile court system, there is no need for adult procedural protections.1 s
7.

W.

STAPLETON

& L.

TEITELBAUM, IN DEFENSE

ROLE OF COUNSEL IN AMERICAN JUVENILE COURTS 11

OF YOUTH, A STUDY OF THE
(1972)[hereinafter cited as IN

DEFENSE OF YOUTH].

8. See, e.g., McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971)(juveniles are denied
the right to jury trials in delinquency adjudication proceedings).
9. See generally Eber, Application of the Rules Against Search and Seizure to
Juvenile Delinquency Proceedings, 16 BUFFALO L. REV. 462 (1966-67).
10. In re Scott, 24 Cal. 3d 395, 401, 595 P.2d 105, 155 Cal. Rptr. 671 (1979).

11.

See

IN DEFENSE OF YOUTH,

supra note 7, at 12-23.

12. See Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 554-55 (1966).
13. Although juvenile delinquency dispositions are aimed at rehabilitating
rather than punishing errant youth, children are oftentimes deprived of their freedom
as a result and are labeled "delinquent," which carries similar negative connotations
to that of "convict" and creates similar disabilities. See, e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S.
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The second and more persuasive justification given by the
state for limiting the use of adult procedural protections in
the juvenile court system is the need to preserve the personal
nature of juvenile proceedings." The argument is that, the introduction of adult safeguards into the juvenile court system
would deprive the system of its "informality, flexibility or
speed,' 1 5 all of which are central to the state's intimate paren-

tal relationship with a child.16 Therefore, the state has advocated limiting the use of adult procedures and protections in
juvenile proceedings because they would threaten or at least
encumber this protective purpose of the juvenile court system.
In the past decade, however, the state's assumption that
the legal safeguards inherent in the juvenile court system adequately protect the rights of children has been challenged.'"
As a result of evidence of abuse of children's rights and of a
startlingly high rate of recidivism among children treated in
the juvenile system,' 8 courts have begun to recognize the need
for applying constitutional protections to children.
III.

THE EXTENSION OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS TO
CHILDREN

It was not until the last quarter century that the United
States Supreme Court recognized a child's right to protection
against unfair treatment by the state. The Court had previously guaranteed these rights only to adults under its inter358, 365-66 (1970).
14. See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 534 (1971).
15. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 366 (1970).
16. See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545 (1971); Kent v. United
States, 383 U.S. 541, 555 (1966).
17. The United States Supreme Court has stated that "there is evidence ...
that there may be grounds for concern that the child receives the worst of both
worlds: that he gets neither the protections accorded to adults nor the solicitous care
and regenerative treatment postulated for children." Kent v. United States, 383 U.S.
541, 556 (1966).

18. The California Legislature noted that "[niot a single shred of evidence exists to indicate that any significant number of [beyond control children] have benefited [by juvenile court intervention]. In fact, what evidence does exist points to the
contrary." J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE
CHILD 213 n.2 (1979) (quoting Report of the California Assembly Interim Committee
On Criminal Procedure, Juvenile Court Processes 7 (1971)).
THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND YOUTH CRIME (1967) cites evi-

dence of the failures of the juvenile system and reports that "one-third of all delin-

quency cases involved repeaters ...." Id. at 23.
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pretation of the scope of the Bill of Rights. Starting with the
Court's recent determination that children are "persons" to be
protected under the fourteenth amendment, 9 the Court has
gradually begun to grant due process and other constitutional
rights to minors.
Although the fourteenth amendment automatically affords due process protections to adults, the Court has historically treated children's due process rights as being conditional.2 0 While it is true that constitutional rights are never
absolute, even when regarding adults, adults are at least acknowledged to possess an unconditional and enforceable right
to receive substantive and procedural constitutional protections in the criminal and, to a more limited extent, civil contexts. It is well settled that adults may be barred from exercising these constitutional rights, however, if countervailing
state interests outweigh the adults' constitutional interests at
issue.
In contrast, it seems that children are not presumed to
possess constitutional rights. They must first demonstrate a
justifiable need for such protections before the Court will utilize a balancing test to determine if a child's interests outweigh
the state interests involved: a two-step process as opposed to
the one-step balancing used by the Court in adult cases.
Children's constitutional rights are thus conditional and the
Court has tempered these rights by weighing the state's interests in protecting the child, and preserving the flexible and
informal nature of the juvenile court system, against the
child's need for, as opposed to the right to, the procedural
safeguard at issue.21 In this regard, the Court has consistently
employed a due process balancing test in determining whether
to extend to children a particular constitutional safeguard enjoyed by adults.
As a result of balancing the state's protection interests
against the child's due process rights to fair treatment,2 2 the
19. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 243 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting in
part); Tinker v. Des Moines School District, 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969).
20. See, e.g., Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979).
21. See Smith, An Analysis of When Juveniles Must Be Afforded Due Process
Rights, 58 NEB. L. REV. 136, 140 (1979).
22. See Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. at 562; In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 30
(1967); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 359 (1970).
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Court has thus far denied juveniles the right to a jury trial,23
while selectively granting the right to a reasonable doubt standard of proof in juvenile "criminal" proceedings;24 the safeguards of due process in a civil,25 as well as a criminal context;26 freedom of speech;2 7 and rights to equal protection

against discrimination because of illegitimacy.2 8
In its most far-reaching decision in this area, In re
Gault,2 ' the Court urged that "whatever may be their precise

impact, neither the fourteenth amendment nor the Bill of
Rights is for adults alone." 80 The Court held that, in the adju:
dicatory phase of a juvenile delinquency proceeding, the juvenile is entitled to the rights to counsel, to notice of charges, to
the privilege against self-incrimination, and to the opportunity for cross-examination of witnesses when faced with the
possibility of incarceration.3 ' All of these safeguards had, up
to that time, been available only in adult criminal
proceedings.
What is significant about this line of cases is that the
Court in each instance initiated its inquiry by examining the
importance of the juvenile's procedural protection at issue. 2
The Court then weighed the consequences of denying the constitutional safeguard to the minor defendant, against the burden such procedures would impose upon the beneficial aspects
of the juvenile system.'3 Thus, what comes out of these decisions is the notion that, when the right under consideration by
the Court is procedural in nature, the Court must counterbalance the state's interests in protecting children and preserving
the unique nature of the juvenile system, against the child's
assertion of due process rights to fair treatment.
It is important to distinguish that when a child's consti23. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
24. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
25. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
26. Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975).
27. Tinker v. Des Moines School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
28. Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977).
29. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
30. Id. at 13.
31. The Court limited its holding to apply only to the adjudicatory stage of
juvenile proceedings. Id.
32. See Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 556 (1966); In re Winship, 397 U.S.
358, 363 (1970); McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 543 (1971).
33. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 21, 29 (1967); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 36364, 366 (1970).
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tutional right to procedural protections is at issue, the Court's
investigation will not include consideration of the child's privacy interests because they are usually not relevant in the
procedural context."4 Instead, the Court will most often focus
only on whether the individual received the fundamentals of
due process and fair treatment," and whether the state's interests in preserving the unique nature of the juvenile system
and in protecting children are involved.
On the other hand, in those situations where the Court is
examining the potential application to children of a substantive right involving privacy, both a child's due process rights
and his privacy rights are relevant to the Court's inquiry. In
addition, any state interest in protecting the child that may
justify a restriction on his rights, as well as any state interests
in parental autonomy and family integrity will also enter into
the balancing process. The state's interest in preserving the
informal, flexible nature of the juvenile system, however, will
not be relevant in the privacy context as it often is in the procedural rights context. The specific factors that the Court examines in the privacy rights analysis, and the particular manner in which they are weighed by the Court, can best be
understood after reviewing the privacy decisions which follow.
In addition, in those situations where a child's privacy
rights are involved, state interests in parental autonomy and
family integrity will be weighed by the Court against the
child's privacy interests. The specific factors that the Court
examines in a privacy rights analysis, and the particular manner in which they are weighed by the Court, can best be understood after reviewing the privacy decisions which follow.

IV.
A.

FEDERAL PRIVACY RIGHTS

The Development of a ConstitutionalRight of Privacy
As recognized by the Court in Whalen v. Roe,"0
the concept of a constitutional right of privacy still re-

34. Fourth and fifth amendment cases involving the question of whether to exclude certain illegally obtained evidence or coerced confessions are unique in that
both procedural due process and privacy issues are involved. In those cases, the minor
should assert his rights available under the specific constitutional provision violated
as well as his right to privacy.
35. See text accompanying note 22 supra.
36. 429 U.S. 589 (1977).

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 21

mains largely undefined. There are at least three facets
that have been partially revealed, but their form and
shape remain to be fully ascertained. The first is the right
of the individual to be free in his private affairs from governmental surveillance and intrusion. The second is the
right of an individual not to have his private affairs made
public by the government. The third is the right of an
individual to be free in action, thought,
experience and
37
belief from governmental compulsion.
The seminal decision in this area is Griswold v. Connecticut,3 8 in which Justice Douglas found a fundamental right of
privacy to exist in the penumbra of explicit constitutional
guarantees of the first, fourth and fifth amendments."' According to subsequent interpretations of Griswold, the Court
was concerned in that decision with unjustified governmental
40
intrusion into personal autonomy.
The Court further established privacy as an implicit constitutional right in the landmark case of Roe v. Wade."' The
majority in Roe held the right of privacy to "be founded in
4
the fourteenth amendment's concept of personal liberty.'
The Court determined that "only personal rights that can be
deemed 'fundamental' or 'implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty' are included in this guarantee of personal privacy. ' ' 43
However, the Court found that "the privacy right. . . cannot
be said to be absolute"" and accordingly acknowledged that
these rights could be limited "where important state interests
''5
provide compelling justifications for intervention.
These cases establish a right to privacy, although they are
not in agreement as to the particular provision of the Constitution from which the right emanates. As to the nature of the
privacy right, Roe gives us guidance in stating that it involves
only fundamental personal rights which must be weighed
37. Id. at 599 n.24.
38. 381 U.S. 479 (1965)(held invalid a prohibition against the use of contraceptives by married people).
39. Id. at 483-85.
40. See Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U.S. 678, 687 (1977).
41. 410 U.S. 113 (1973)(held that absent a compelling state interest, the state
may not interfere with a woman's decision whether to procure an abortion).
42. Id. at 153.
43. Id. at 152 (citing Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)).
44. Id. at 154.
45. Id. at 165-66.
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against countervailing state interests. Other privacy decisions
have utilized the balancing test embraced in Roe 4 and have
further defined the right of privacy as "the right of an individual . . . to be free of unwarranted governmental intrusion
S. .- into matters regarding the family" or involving an individual's "independence in making certain kinds of impor'49
tant decisions.
B.

Recognition of Children's Privacy Rights

In Planned Parenthood v. Danforth,50 regarding a minor's right to decide whether to abort, the Court explicitly extended the right of privacy to minors. 51 The Court reasoned
that "[c]onstitutional rights do not mature and come into being magically only when one attains the state-defined age of
majority. Minors, as well as adults, are protected by the Constitution and possess constitutional rights.""
The Court restated this view in Carey v. PopulationSer5 a Carey involved a state statute that
vices International.
made it a crime (1) "for any person to sell or distribute any
contraceptive of any kind to a minor under 16 years; (2) for
anyone other than a licensed pharmacist to distribute contraceptives to persons 16 or over; and (3) for anyone, including
licensed pharmacists, to advertise or display contraceptives. ''
Justice Brennan, speaking for only a plurality of the Court,5 5
held invalid the provision prohibiting the sale and distribution of contraceptives to minors on the ground that it impermissibly interfered with a minor's privacy rights. Justice
Brennan's opinion emphasized that minors are endowed with
constitutional rights, but noted that state power over children
46. Id. at 154-59.
47. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 443 (1972).
48. See, e.g., Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
49. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. at 599-600.
50. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
51. Id. at 74 (holding in part, that a state does not have constitutional authority
to condition a minor's decision to terminate her pregnancy on parental consent).
52. Id.
53. 431 U.S. 678 (1977)(held restrictions on minors' access to contraceptives
invalid).
54. Id. at 681.
55. Id. at 691-99. On the minors' issue, Justice Brennan's views were joined only
by Justices Stewart, Marshall, and Blackmun.

508
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may be greater than that over adults." Brennan warned that
"the question of the extent of state power to regulate the conduct of minors not constitutionally regulable when committed
by adults is a vexing one, perhaps not susceptible to precise
57

answer.1

Justice Brennan's observation has rung true in the
Court's recent decisions. Since Danforth and Carey, the Court
has obfuscated the parameters of children's privacy rights, although the Court has given some indication of the factors
which play a role in limiting these rights. In both Parham v.
J.R.55 and Bellotti v. Baird" the Court gave great weight to
the state's interest in preserving the family unit, but with opposite results. The issue in Parham was whether due process
requires a hearing before a parent or guardian may commit a
child to a state mental hospital. The Court acknowledged that
a child has a protectible right to privacy "in common with
adults," which it called a liberty interest. 0 The majority initially diluted the minor's rights by subordinating them to parents' concerns. 1 The Court then weighed them against the
state interests involved and subsequently denied the child's
right to a pre-commitment hearing. The Court thus treated
children as having only conditonal liberty or a qualified right
of privacy.
Most recently in Bellotti the Court acknowledged the
unique status of children in our society and further emphasized that the important state interest in the family "required
that constitutional principles be applied with sensitivity and
flexibility to the special needs of parents and children. ' ' 62 Although Justice Powell's opinion s enumerated "three reasons
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. 442 U.S. 584 (1979)(upheld a statute providing for commitment of minors to
state mental hospitals by their parent or guardian without a hearing prior to commitment, but required a neutral fact-finder to take part in the admissions decision).
59. 443 U.S. 622 (1979)(held invalid a law requiring unmarried pregnant minors
to obtain consent of both parents, or, when parental consent is denied, to obtain judicial approval following notification of the minor's parents as prerequisite to an
abortion).
60. 442 U.S. at 608.
61. Id. at 599-600.
62. 443 U.S. at 634.
63. The Court divided 8 to 1 in holding the consent provision unconstitutional,
but split 4 to 4 regarding the judicial "good cause" proceedings as a viable alternative
to a parental consent provision. Id. at 652. Justice Powell's opinion was joined by

19811

PRIVACY

justifying the conclusion that the constitutional rights of children cannot be equated with those of adults,"" the Court
nonetheless recognized that minors are granted constitutional
protections, albeit to a lesser degree than those accorded to
adults. Justice Powell's opinion noted that "[a] child, merely
on account of his minority, is not beyond the protection of the
Constitution." However, consistent with the Court's decisions regarding children's procedural safeguards in the juvenile court system, the Court noted its approval of selective incorporation of constitutional protections for children, stating
that "legal theories and their phrasing in other cases readily
lead to fallacious reasoning if uncritically transferred to determination of a State's duty toward children."66 The Court thus
reiterated its reluctance to extend all of the constitutional
safegards afforded by the Bill of Rights to juveniles.67
The principle to be gathered from these cases is that,
while children are clearly "persons" as defined by the Constitution," and are therefore constitutionally entitled to rights of
privacy, these rights are no more absolute for children than
they are for adults. 69 The real issue, then, is whether a child's
privacy rights are more narrowly circumscribed than an
adult's; "whether some different process is 'due' the juvenile
because liberty means something different for him than it
does for an adult." 70
Although the Court weighs state interests against an
adult's interests when scrutinizing an adult's privacy rights,
Bellotti and Parham in particular indicate that the balancing
test is somewhat different when applied to children. In the
case of a minor, the Court initially limits the child's interests
by tempering them with any applicable state interests in preserving the family or promoting parental authority before
Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart and Rehnquist. Id. at 622.
64. Id at 634. The Court's justifications for restricting minors' constitutional
rights are 1) the peculiar vulnerability of children, 2) their inability to make critical
decisions in an informed, mature manner, and 3) the importance of the parental role
in child-rearing. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. See, e.g., Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 556 (1966).
68. See cases cited note 19 supra.
69. See text accompanying note 20 supra.
70. Garvey, Child, Parent,State, and the Due Process Clause: An Essay on the
Supreme Court's Recent Work, 51 S.CAL. L. REv. 769 (1977-78).
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weighing the child's privacy interests against the other state
interests involved.7 ' Thus, a child's right to privacy is qualified, before it even enters into the balancing process, by the
interests of both the parents, as legal guardians of their children, and the state, as substitute parent under the doctrine of
parens patriae.
The extent to which a child's rights are limited, however,
depends upon the context in which they are asserted and, particularly, upon whether parental interests are in conflict with
the child's interests, thus jeopardizing the family unit. In analyzing children's privacy rights then, the interests involved are
the child's fundamental autonomy interests, parental concerns, and important state interests. These three interests are
not actually balanced against one another, but are treated by
the Court as a tripartite among which it tries to reach a consensus, or a compromise.
V.

A.

LIMITATIONS ON CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF CHILDREN

State Limitations on Children's Rights

Although parents are legally responsible for the care and
support of their children, the state has traditionally held both
a right and an obligation to protect and provide for children
whose parents are not performing their duties adequately.
Quite apart from what either the parents or their children
may wish, certain juvenile behavior is controlled by state statutes which operate as "legally imposed limitations on a child's
power to decide."' The state has generally been held to possess somewhat broader authority to regulate the activities of
children in certain areas because of their inherent vulnerability and the need to provide for their welfare.73
For example, in Prince v. Massachusetts,7' the Court upheld the conviction of the guardian of a nine year old girl for
violating child labor laws by allowing the minor to sell reli71. See, e.g., Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584.
72. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 11350 (West 1980); CAL. GOV'T CODE
§ 1020 (West 1980) (minors not allowed to hold public office); CAL. LAB. CODE
§§ 1285-1312 (West Supp. 1980) (minors not allowed to work in various occupations);
CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §6 25658-665 (West 1964) (minors not allowed to buy li-

quor); CAL. CONST. art. II, § 1 (minors under a certain age not allowed to vote).
73. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944); Ginsberg v. New York,
390 U.S. 629, 638 (1968); see note 64 supra.
74. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
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gious pamphlets on a public street. The Court noted that
"[w]hat may be wholly permissible for adults. . may not be
so for children, either with or without their parents' presence." ' The Court supported state authority to limit children's rights on the notion that "democratic society rests, for
its continuance, upon the healthy, well-rounded growth of
young people into full maturity as citizens . . . . It may secure this against impeding restraints and dangers within a
broad range of selection. ' '7 ' The Court went on to note that
"[a]cting to guard [this] general interest in youth's well-being,
the state as parens patriae may restrict the parents' control
by requiring school attendance, regulating or prohibiting the
'
child's labor and in many other ways." 7
In Ginsberg v. New Yorks78 the Court again upheld the
'79
state's "independent interest in the well-being of its youth.
The majority validated a state statute which subjected a minor's first amendment freedoms to restrictions which would
not be constitutionally permissible if applied to adults. Under
that statute, luncheonette owners were criminally prosecuted
for selling materials to a sixteen year old boy that were found
to be obscene with respect to minors under the age of seventeen, but which were not obscene for adults.
In justifying the state's limitation on minors' first amendment rights, the Court explained that "[t]he well-being of its
children is of course a subject within the State's constitutional
power to regulate."8 0 The Court in Ginsberg described two
state interests that provided a rational basis for the regulation
in question. First, the court recognized the state's independent interest in protecting children from abuse by imposing
reasonable regulations on the sale of obscene materials to
them. 81 The Court accorded great weight to this protection interest. Second, the regulation aids parents in their responsibility for their child's well-being by setting a standard for what
sex-related material is suitable for minors.a In examining this
75. Id. at 169.
76.

Id. at 168.

77. Id. at 166.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

390 U.S. 629 (1968).
Id. at 640.
Id. at 639.
Id. at 640-41.
Id. at 639.

512
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state interest, the Court emphasized that the state was not
displacing parental authority under the statute, as it had in
Prince, but in effect deferred to parental authority since the
statute did not prohibit parents from buying and distributing
obscene materials to their children. This differentiation is significant only because it bears on the context in which the minor's rights are asserted, i.e., in the home versus in public,
with parental approval as opposed to without or against parental approval.
In this regard, the Court's approach in Prince and Ginsberg provides guidance for privacy cases. The limitations upheld in Prince and Ginsberg were justified by the state's interest in protecting the health, welfare and morals of minors.
These decisions demonstrate the Court's willingness to restrict minors' rights and limit parental control in certain situations. Specifically, the Court is more restrictive regarding a
child's activities in a public setting where he is potentially
more vulnerable than in his own home, and a child's conduct
rather than his decision-making ability regarding personal
matters. Thus, it appears that when a minor's privacy rights
are challenged by state regulation of his conduct outside of
the home, the state's interest in protecting children will outweigh both the child's right to autonomous development and
the parents' interest in autonomous control of their child. 88
Recently, however, the Court has challenged actions by
the state when it restricts minors' conduct in its role as a parent-substitute. In Tinker v. Des Moines School District,8 4 the
Court protected minor students' rights to non-disruptive free
speech from intervention by state public school officials. The
Court balanced state educational goals against students' constitutional rights and upheld the students' right to wear armbands in public school.8 0 The Court found that, even though
school officials act in loco parentis to their students, they do
not possess absolute authority over school children since the
83. As basis for the argument that the Court accords more deferential treatment to conduct exalted in the home, see Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557
(1969)(Court upheld an adult's right to view obscene materials at home).
84. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
85. The Court in Tinker held unconstitutional an attempt by the state to suspend students who wore black armbands to school in protest of the Vietnam War.
The majority concluded that "[s]tudents . . . are 'persons' under our Constitution.
They are possessed of fundamental rights which the State must respect." Id. at 511.
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childrens' parents do not even possess such authority. Furthermore, the authority of school employees over children differs from the scope of parental authority because the educational institution does not enjoy explicit constitutional
protection as does the family.
The school setting presents particular problems in defining the scope of the state's authority over minors.5 6 School officials are state employees who have a duty to enforce both
school regulations and local laws on the school premises. They
also have an obligation to maintain discipline in order to protect the health, safety and morality of the students. 87 The
congregation of large numbers of children in school makes
their discipline and control imperative. Therefore, the state
has legitimate interests in promoting the smooth operation of
schools and in protecting the welfare of students. Because the
students' conduct in Tinker did not affect the health, safety
or morality of fellow students, the state's interest in controlling the students was not sufficient to outweigh the minors'
constitutional rights. It follows, then, that the Court will give
greater deference to privacy rights if the student's conduct
does not significantly disrupt the school atmosphere or challenge the child's welfare.
The Supreme Court's most explicit statement regarding
state limitations on privacy rights with respect to individual
decision-making ability came in Roe v. Wade," which involved state interference with a woman's abortion decision.
Roe demonstrates that the Court will give greater weight to a
person's privacy rights, in the case of an adult, when the state
is interfering with an important personal decision, such as
whether to obtain an abortion or to use contraceptives. The
majority in Roe called for minimum state interference with a
woman's right of privacy absent a legitimate state concern for
health and safety.
The privacy interest in making intimate decisions that
was established in Roe was extended to minors in Planned
Parenthood v. Danforth.89 The Court in Danforth explicitly
86. The discussion here is limited to the grade and high school situations because higher educatonal institutions deal primarily with persons over the age of
majority.
87. See, e.g., CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48900 (West Supp. 1980).
88. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
89. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
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recognized a minor's privacy rights and further limited state
intervention concerning abortions. In invalidating a statute
that required a pregnant minor to obtain her parents' consent
for an abortion, the majority emphasized that "the State does
not have constitutional authority to give a third party an absolute, and possibly arbitrary, veto. . ."90 over a minor's decision whether to abort. The Court held that the minor's right
of privacy outweighed parental and state protection interests.91 Danforth and Roe seem to warn the state to remain as
neutral as possible in situations involving the privacy rights of
parents and of children so as to not threaten family unity.9e
Central to the Court's holding in Danforth was the conclusion that children have as much right as adults to make
important personal decisions which significantly affect their
psychological and physical health (although children's rights
regarding their conduct may be more limited).9 8 Consequently, the state must show more than an interest in the minor's welfare to justify intruding into the most private aspects
of her life. Roe provides guidance as to how much "more" of a
state interest the state must demonstrate. The Court in Roe
held that the state's interest in a pregnant woman becomes
compelling at the end of the first trimester of the pregnancy
since at that point the life of the mother would be seriously
endangered by an abortion." Therefore, it is reasonable to
conclude that the Court will find any state interference with a
minor's right of privacy regarding important personal decisions to be unduly burdensome unless the state can demonstrate a compelling justification for the intrusion.
The majority in Carey v. Population Services International" also rejected unreasonable state limitations on the
privacy rights of minors, but seemed to lower the threshold
for justifiable state interference. Justice Brennan's quartet"
rejected the state's argument in justification of a law which
90. Id. at 74.
91. Id. at 75.
92. As clarified by the Court in more recent decisions, state interests in keeping
a family intact serve as primary justification for the Court to limit children's privacy
rights. See, e.g., Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
93. See note 83 and accompanying text supra; note 99 and accompanying text
infra.
94. 410 U.S. at 162-63.

95. 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
96. See note 55 and accompanying text supra.
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prohibited distributing contraceptives to persons under sixteen. Justice Brennan concluded that an alleged "significant"
interest in promoting the state's policy of discouraging sexual
activity among minors was not a sufficient basis for regulating
the conduct of minors."' Thus, after Carey, the Court may allow further restrictions on a child's right of privacy since the
state must show only a significant, rather than a compelling
reason for the limiting of the child's rights in decision-making.
It appears that a state interest in the morality of minors,
in light of the Court's decision in Carey, does not constitute a
"significant interest" to justify limiting minors' privacy rights.
The Court in Ginsberg v. New York,9 8 however, found the
state's morality concerns sufficient to justify restriction of first
amendment freedoms. This discrepancy demonstrates the
Court's position that greater state interests are required to
overcome a minor's privacy right in making certain personal
decisions than are required to restrict the minor's right to prie Therefore, it seems
vacy in engaging in certain conduct."
that
the right of privacy provides more significant protection
against state intrusions regarding an individual's right to independently make certain decisions concerning situations not
directly covered by the Bill of Rights, such as the right to use
contraceptives, than regarding conduct explicitly protected
under the Constitution, such as the first amendment right to
freely express oneself by wearing an armband. The Court in
Bellotti v. Baird, for example, emphasized the "unique nature
of the abortion decision"100 and concluded that limitations on
minor's rights in contexts other than involving abortion have
traditionally been imposed and will continue to be permissible
where reasonable. The Court thus expressed its uneasiness
with the privacy analysis.
The decisions in Bellotti and in Parham signify a retrenchment, based upon the Court's priority for preserving
97.
98.
99.

431 U.S. at 694-96.
390 U.S. 629 (1968).
See, e.g., United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938)(Jus-

tice Stone, in a now renowned footnote, first alluded to a double standard of judicial
review, although in a different context than pursued in this article, and advocated
closer scrutiny of situations involving fundamental personal rights than the deference
traditionally accorded matters concerning commercial transactions). Id. at 152 n.4.

100. 443 U.S. at 642. In distinguishing the abortion situation, the Court stated
that "there are few situations in which denying a minor the right to make an impor-

tant decision will have consequences so grave and indelible." Id.
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the family structure, in the area of children's rights. The majority in Bellotti goes out of its way to indicate a willingness
to uphold limitations on minors' rights which are protective of
the child and of the family unit, as long as those restrictions
are not unduly burdensome. Likewise, the Court in Parham
emphasized its deference to the traditional concept "of the
family as a unit with broad parental authority over minor
children." 101 Both decisions reflect the Court's present reluctance to further extend this broad and rather amorphous right
of privacy. Bellotti and Parham also indicate how the children's rights issue becomes further complicated where conflicting family or parental interests, as well as state concerns,
are involved.
B.

ParentalInterests Limiting Children's Rights

Where no conflicting interests are asserted by a child, parental interests in the welfare of their off-spring have generally been given precedence over countervailing state interests.
The Court has consistently respected the parental liberty,
protected by the fourteenth amendment, to freely direct their
02
children's development. In both Meyer v. Nebraska1 and
Pierce v. Society of Sisters,0 3 the Court asserted that "the
liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and
education of children under their control" is essential to the
14
successful operation of our society. " Although parents are
commanded by statutes in many areas to restrict their child's
freedom, as well as to provide adequate care for the child,
they are usually allowed substantial deference in the performance of these duties.
The rationale for allowing parents to exert such broad authority over children is that parents typically act in their children's best interests. 0 5 Furthermore, such deference is seen as
101. 442 U.S. at 602.
102. 262 U.S. 390 (1923)(invalidating a statute forbidding the teaching in school
of any language other than English through the eighth grade).
103. 268 U.S. 510 (1925)(invalidating a statute that required children between
the ages of eight and sixteen to attend the public schools of the state that prohibited
them from receiving private instruction).
is cardinal with us that the
104. Similarly, the Court in Prince stated that "[i]t

custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor
hinder." 321 U.S. at 166.
105. See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. at 602.
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encouraging a strong family unit which is considered fundamental to our society."' 6 Since the family is viewed as the basic social unit charged with inculcating values and morals in
our youth, providing for their physical needs and taking responsibility for their socialization, 107 the Court should allow
the state to interfere with the parent-child relationship only
as a last resort. Parents do not have absolute dominion over
children, however, since the state is justified in using statutes
to limit parental liberty where necessary for the good of the
child or society. 0 8
Where the interests asserted by a child are in conflict
with those of his parents, however, the Court's approach differs due to the potential family disharmony. It is clear that
whenever a child's interests are challenged by state action,
family interests are inextricably involved and have been historically shown great deference by the Court. 09 The notion of
a right to family autonomy was embraced by the Court in
Parham v. J.R. and Bellotti v. Baird in particular. The right
to family autonomy grew out of due process and privacy concepts and gained substance as a means of protecting and promoting the parent-child relationship. ' 10
Family autonomy is distinct from parental autonomy in
the practical sense that the Court will always balance a combination of the parents' autonomy interests and the child's
concerns, against the state interests in examining a child's privacy right. The right to family autonomy, however, will enter
into the Court's balance only if the family unit is intact and
the interests of parent and child are not in conflict. It is therefore important to consider the status of the family relationship when examining a minor's privacy right.
Where family interests are in direct conflict with the
child's interests, the Court will most likely weigh family interests against the child's interests. That is, the child's interests
must outweigh both state interests and parental concerns.
106.
STEIN,

A

See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977); see also J. GOLDFREUD

& A.

SOLNIT, BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD

3-14 (1979).

107. See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503-04 (1977).
108. See note 72 and accompanying text supra.
109. See, e.g., Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584.
110. To trace the development of the family autonomy concept see generally
Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977); Smith v. Organization of Foster
Families, 431 U.S. 816 (1977); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
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The underlying reason for this approach is that in certain situations, such' as juvenile pregnancy, conflict may arise between parent and child and the family structure is often fractured."1 Consequently, the state interest in safeguarding the
family unit and parental authority is diminished and is no
longer sufficient to outweigh the child's interest in personal
autonomy. The Court is faced in these situations with the dilemma of having to independently consider both the child's
right to autonomous development and his right to the benefits
of behavioral control exerted by both the state and his par2
ents, which might well be in conflict with one another.
Greater weight will probably be given to the minor's privacy
interests than to parental concerns when the family is in
conflict.
However, where the family unit appears intact, additional
state interests attach and therefore may outweigh the child's
privacy interests. The result is that the odds are greater in the
juvenile context that a child's constitutional protections will
be limited due to countervailing state interests bolstered by
family interests.
In all cases involving juvenile privacy rights, the Court
will consider the same factors: the nature of the child's interests at stake, family concerns, and state interests involved.
The test will always remain the same-a balance. However,
the results may differ since the factors may be aligned differently depending on whether the child is in conflict with the
family, or whether the right under consideration is procedural
in nature, or whether it involves the child's right to engage in
certain conduct or to make decisions of a personal nature.
VI.

CONCLUSION

On the one hand, it is easy to rationalize that children,
due to their immaturity and vulnerability, have a need for
greater constitutional protections than are typically afforded
adults. On the other hand, it can be argued that if children
are subject to the same constitutional protections as are
adults, families will be exposed to increased risks of judicial
and state interference and the nature of parental responsibil111. See Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 75.
112. This dilemma is examined in detail in Hafen, Puberty, Privacy and Protection, 63 A.B.A. J. 1383 (1977).
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ity will be questioned. The Court's most recent juvenile rights
decisions reflect its struggle with this dilemma and indicate a
reluctance to further extend children's privacy rights.
The Court will no doubt continue to employ a balancing
analysis when examining a minor's privacy interests because
the weighing process gives the Court much flexibility in its
treatment of these issues. The Court's decisions in Parham
and Bellotti emphasize that the most determinative factor in
the Court's decision whether to award greater deference to juvenile privacy interests than to state and parental protection
interests, is the status of the family unit and whether the
right asserted by the minor has caused substantial family conflict. In the absence of such disharmony, it will be extremely
difficult for the child's privacy interests to prevail in the
weighing process unless the right asserted by him involves a
decision of a sensitive personal or medical nature. If the minor's interest under scrutiny subjects him to greater vulnerability, particularly of a physical nature, it will be that much
more difficult for him to prevail. The limiting language in the
Parham and Bellotti decisions signals that the Court may be
willing to recognize the privacy rights of children only where
explicit provisions of the Constitution are not directly applicable. Consequently, the present Court has set the parameters
of minors' privacy rights just inside his parents reach. It may
be socially preferable to restrict a minor's rights, but is it really for his own good? The Constitution provides substantial
protection for adults-let children enjoy its protections too,
and let them keep their privacy.
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